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INTRODUCTION
Imagine a debtor is sliding towards bankruptcy.1 The debtor sells off
real estate of substantial value and eventually pays back the amount due
on a loan extended by a bank-creditor. The debtor then simultaneously
deposits the left-over sum from the real estate sale into an account,
subject to the bank’s security interest, with the same bank-creditor. A
small amount of time passes, and the debtor petitions for bankruptcy
under Chapter 7. In accordance with established duties,2 the bankruptcy
estate Trustee argues that that loan-fulfillment made by the debtor to the
creditor before the petition is a preferential transfer. The Trustee argues
that the debtor’s payment of the outstanding loan balance puts the bankcreditor into a better position relative to other creditors and depletes the
estate’s value, thus prejudicing the unsecured and previously perfected
classes.3 Does it seem equitable to allow a simple simultaneous payment
and deposit to reduce the remuneration available to all creditors?
Within the Bankruptcy Code (hereinafter the “Code”) of 1978,
Chapter 7 delineates the process of liquidating and distributing the nonexempt assets from a petitioning debtor to creditors.4 A court-appointed
Trustee oversees the liquidation and distribution process to maximize the
1 See Insolvency, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insolvency.asp (last
visited Feb. 11, 2018) (This condition is known as insolvency, which Investopedia defines as “when
an organization, or individual, can no longer meet its financial obligations with its lender or lenders
as debts become due.”).
2 See Rhodes, infra note 25.
3 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2012); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547 (Richard Levin & Henry
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
4 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-28 (2012); see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 700.01 (Richard
Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (delineating the general administrative procedure of
Chapter 7 liquidation). In an average bankruptcy petition, the court will grant an automatic stay to
protect the assets of the debtor and those of the estate. This will be followed by the appointment of
a Trustee empowered to liquidate the non-exempt assets of the debtor, and distribute them pro-rata
along the class-oriented schema of the Code. Secured creditors receiving their entirety before
unsecured, and so on.
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benefits for all creditors within each respective class.5 As part of the
Trustee’s litany of responsibilities, the Trustee is invested with the ability
to initiate an adversarial proceeding during the bankruptcy, otherwise
known as a voidable preference action under Section 547 of the Code.6
Voidable preference actions are an attempt to effectively unwind
transactions that involve payments to creditors on behalf of antecedent
liabilities within the period during which the debtor is considered by the
court to have been insolvent.7 These proceedings allow a Trustee to
maximize the bankruptcy estate by seeking, for instance, to void a
transfer to an unsecured creditor that would otherwise put that creditor in
a better position relative to other creditors of the same category ahead of
receiving their pro-rata share of the distribution of a debtor’s assets.8
Crucially, the court in a voidable preference action9 is asked to construct
a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation proceeding to determine if in fact—
hypothetically—a transfer has benefitted an under-secured creditor,
having made that party “better off” relative to other creditors of the same
class.10 If the court determines that, but for this hypothetical test and the
rescindment of the disputed transfer, the creditor would be in a better
position, then the transfer is deemed preferential and thus falls under the
auspices of the Trustee to void it.11 In this way, the courts have
empowered the Trustee to protect the debtor’s estate from depletion
during the bankruptcy proceeding in an effort to seek out the most
advantageous outcome for each class of creditors.12
The Code also recognizes creditors’ right to ask the court to lift the
stay13 to allow a creditor to pursue a set-off right14 against a debt owed

5

See Rhodes, infra note 25, at 164-65.
See infra note 8.
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (outlining the hypothetical test of a valid avoidable preference as
a transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, “(5) that enables such creditor to receive more
than such creditor would receive if: (A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this title [11 USCS
§§ 701]; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt
to the extent provided by the provisions of this title [11 USCS §§ 101]”); see also COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds. 16th ed.).
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (b)(5).
10 Id.
11 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2012). See Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable
Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1985).
12 See Countryman, supra note 11.
13 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). See also K&LNG, Getting to Know Your Two Best Friends:
The Rights of Setoff and Recoupment, KLGATES: K&LNGALERT (Dec. 2005), http://
www.klgates.com/files/Publication/56da8ca6-ba6a-4973-8fa4-3b2d8aaf05a5/Presentation/
PublicationAttachment/77554d2e-5845-481f-9f1c-4f3a7f161e4d/ba1205.pdf (a general discussion
of the right to set off being limited, not granted by the Code).
14 See Hall, infra note 15.
6
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by the creditor to the petitioning debtor.15 In a Section 553 set-off right
action, subject to limitations laid out in the Code, though not including
the section pertaining to voidable preferences, creditors may reduce the
amount they owe the debtor by an amount that the debtor owes the
creditor in return.16 Important for discussion later on, one example of a
mutual debt warranting applying a set-off right includes cash in a
standard deposit account at the debtor’s bank.17 In practice, a creditor may
try and interpret that when a payment is made briefly before a deposit is
left to that same creditor, their right to set-off a mutual debt allows them
to circumvent the distribution proceedings of the Code. Crucially, this
right to set-off can create a Gordian knot in the context of the hypothetical
test above in determining if an under-secured creditor undergoes an
unwarranted improvement in position.18
In three parts, this Note will highlight the tension between Section
547 and Section 553 of the Code, with specific attention paid to the
interaction between set-off rights and the hypothetical liquidation
invoked by a court in a voidable preference action. This Note will propose
adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as a bankruptcy court standard
when confronted with a similar conflict between the formalized tests in
Sections 547 and 553, in an attempt to achieve a more equitable outcome.
Adopting the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning will empower a court to launch a
further hypothetical preference action within the context of a hypothetical
Chapter 7 liquidation, and to read a broader definition of when an interest
in property has been transferred, in order to preserve the intentions of
voidable preference law, and close a loophole in the determination of
when a creditor surreptitiously improves its position per Section 553.
Part I will examine the mechanics and important policies underlying
the Code, such as the equality of creditors in the same class, and the
courts’ focus on maximizing benefits to creditors, as seen in Chapter 7
liquidation proceedings. Part I will also survey Section 547 voidable
preference law hypotheticals and Section 553 set-off rights which offer
important insight for this Note. Part II will analyze the current legal
analysis of transfers of interests in property Section 547 voidable
preferences and Section 553 set-off rights, culminating in the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in In re Tenderloin Health, FKA (hereinafter In re

15 Beverly J. Hall, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy Law: Preferences and Setoffs: Sections
547 and 553, 2 BANK. DEV. J. 49, 75-76 (1985).
16 See Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problem with Setoff: A Proposed Legislative Solution, 30 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 51, 51-52 (1988).
17 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(describing a basic outline of the interactions between set off rights and voidable preferences,
including an example regarding bank accounts).
18 The facts of In re Tenderloin can be read in this light. I will discuss later the equities given
rise to that may impact the adoption of a judge-made rule.
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Tenderloin).19 Finally, Part III will propose that bankruptcy courts adopt
the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning as a judge-made rule when faced with
creditors utilizing claiming Section 553 set-off rights within the Section
547 voidable preference hypothetical. Part III ends with examining the
rule’s possible application in other circuit courts.
I. THE BANKRUPTCY CODE’S CHAPTER 7, VOIDABLE PREFERENCE
ACTIONS, AND SET-OFF RIGHTS
A.

The Chapter 7 Liquidation and the Duties of the Trustee

For debtors, resorting to Chapter 7 in anticipation of default on prepetition liabilities is a viable way to stave off financial ruin and to prevent
a run on the debtor’s assets by creditors. Since its most recent incarnation
in the Bankruptcy Code of 1978, Chapter 7 liquidation has stood to
enforce major principles embodied in Bankruptcy law, namely:
maximizing the bankruptcy estate in the interest of creditors, and
preserving the equality among creditors of the same category.20
In an average proceeding, a debtor successfully petitioning a court
for Chapter 7 is granted an automatic stay. A Trustee will liquidate any
non-exempt assets in the debtor’s possession, place that value in a
bankruptcy estate under the Trustee’s authority, and distribute the value
among creditors according to their level of security interests.21 Creditors
are forbidden from launching actions against the debtor during the period
of the automatic stay, though as will be discussed infra, petitions to lift
the stay may be granted in circumstances like in Section 553 set-off
actions.22 Those creditors who have secured the debt owed to them on
some collateral are due to receive up to the amount of the value of the
property in question when the Trustee sells off assets to pay the
creditors.23 The proceedings then turn to those unsecured creditors, and
are distributed pro rata among those without priority claims.24 The
ensuing distribution is akin to a sliding scale among creditors, with the
overall objective for the court-appointed estate Trustee to maximize the
distribution of the assets’ value to creditors beyond those with valid and

19 Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir.
2017).ff
20 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶¶ 7.01-.99 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed.).
21 Id.
22 Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
23 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 20.
24 Id.
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perfected security interests.25 However, for many Chapter 7 petitioners,
there may be nothing left for a large portion of unsecured creditors after
the court exempts their essential assets deemed necessary for a “fresh
start.”26 After processing the pro rata distribution and wrapping up
oversight of the bankruptcy estate, the court will discharge personal
liability of the petitioner to their debtors. Accordingly, unsecured and
under secured creditors are well aware that receiving a higher proportion
–rather than pennies on the dollar–for their outstanding interest in the
estate of the debtor depends on their ability to find work-arounds to the
traditional distribution process.27
Understandably, there is an inherent tension between the interests of
the Trustee of the bankruptcy estate and creditors in general, with
unsecured and under secured creditors in the arguably most precarious
position.28 Trustees are motivated by a fiduciary duty to maximize the
distribution of the estate.29 This objective is achieved by a rigorous
adherence to the automatic stay.30 A Trustee would be remiss to not seek
to deter or fight any claim a creditor has to parts of what would otherwise
become property of the bankruptcy estate. Without fail, the Trustee will
attempt to utilize the Code’s roster of adversarial actions to take
advantage of any opportunity to unwind previous transactions and
reclaim more property for distribution.31 Juxtapose those motivations
above with those of the creditor: faced with the possibility of losing out
on recouping any of the amount of the liabilities owed them, it is in the
best interest of unsecured and under secured creditors to take advantage
of any of the provisions of the Code that may facilitate collection beyond
that of the Chapter 7 pro rata distribution process.32
Thus, Sections 547 and 553 provide a glimpse into the inherent push
and pull in the competing interests between the Trustee and creditors. On
25 Steven Rhodes, The Fiduciary and Institutional Obligations of a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy
Trustee, 80 AM. BANKR. L. J. 147, 164 (2006).
26 Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775, 785 (1987) (“Although some
debtors are able to repay all their debts in bankruptcy, the statutory scheme presumes that some
creditors will not enjoy repayment in full.”). It is important to note here that while this is a general
example, Chapter 7 for consumer debtors is more likely to result in the above than Chapter 7 for
corporate debtors.
27 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2012).
28 Rhodes, supra note 25.
29 Id.
30 Rhodes, supra note 25, at 164-65; see 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2012) (enumerating the duties of the
Trustee, including the reduction of assets for the use of the estate and to work in the best interest of
both debtors and creditors).
31 For clarity, this note will be focused primarily on the adversarial action espoused in voidable
preferences in § 547 of 11 U.S.C.
32 Again, and as will be discussed infra Part II, this note’s attention will be primarily focused
on the ability of a court to examine a creditors’ claim of set-off rights within the Section 547(b)(5)
hypothetical.

82

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW DE•NOVO

[2019

the one hand, there is the bankruptcy estate and a Trustee authorized to
implement Section 547 and the doctrine of voidable preference actions.
On the other hand, there are creditors with recognized Section 553 setoff rights.33 If a creditor implements its set-off right successfully, the
claimed set-off may be void proof, and the creditor can thus circumvent
the pro rata distribution to walk away with an increased or complete debt
fulfillment.34 Since bankruptcy statutes are notorious for contrasting
statutory interpretations, it is crucial to understand the nature of the
statutes involved, and Congress’ intent to propose a viable solution to aid
interpretation and implementation of the Code’s goals.35
B.

Section 547 Voidable Preference Actions

Section 547 of the Code can trace its origin back through the last
major iteration of federal bankruptcy law in 1898.36 Now refined, the
Section aims to achieve roughly the same goals, with focus on preventing
an unnecessary depletion of the bankruptcy estate, as well as maximizing
the return of property to creditors in the right order.37 Under Section 547,
Trustees are empowered to target transfers of interests in property to
creditors on behalf of an antecedent debt when made within the debtor’s
period of insolvency.38 If successful, the transfer can be reverted into the
bankruptcy estate, enlarging the relative pie for unsecured and under
secured creditors.39 The starting point for voidable preferences as
considered in the analysis below is with the five conditions of Section
547(b).40
33

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
Id. See Hall, supra note 15, at 76 (discussing the nature of set-off rights being exempted from
preference actions). See also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (expanding on the interaction between set-off rights and voidable preference
actions).
35 See Megan McDermott, A Few Predictions for Justice Gorsuch’s Bankruptcy Jurisprudence,
8 CALIF. L. REV. ONLINE 40 (2017) (explaining, in the context of Supreme Court Justices’
approaches to bankruptcy law, how the field of bankruptcy jurisprudence is famous for broad and
competing statutory interpretations, enticing legal scholars and creating plentiful issues regarding
proper interpretation of statutory provisions).
36 Vern Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV.
713, 721 (1985).
37 See Rhodes, supra note 25.
38 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012).
39 See id. (to be voidable, the transfer must meet all requirements of the provision).
40 Id.
[T]ransfer of an interest of the debtor in property (1) to or for the benefit of a
creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made—
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; or (B)
between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition,
34
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A voidable preference is a pre-petition transfer of property from the
debtor to or on the behalf of the creditor in regards to an antecedent debt
that occurs in the period of the petitioner’s insolvency.41 The movant
seeking to avoid a transfer must show that the pre-petition transfer is (1)
to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) on account of an antecedent debt;
(3) made while the debtor is considered insolvent; (4) on or before ninety
days prior to the filing of the petition, or on or before ninety days to one
year preceding the petitioning, if the transferee is an insider; and (5)
allows the creditor to receive more than if the case were a Chapter 7
liquidation, the transfer had not been made, and the creditor received
payment according to the provisions of the Code.42 If all the above
conditions are met, the Trustee can avoid that transfer of property
pursuant to its power as representative of the bankruptcy estate.43 There
is no requirement to demonstrate an intention behind the transfer in
question; this is in contrast to the notion of a fraudulent transfer.44 Barring
any exemptions included in Section 547, the court will allow the Trustee
to unwind that transaction and recover the assets to be liquidated and
distributed among creditors.45
As a policy, the voidable preference action promotes the principles
of the Code in two important ways. First, an action targeting pre-petition
transfers may deter creditors from expending an inefficient amount of
capital by jockeying to try and salvage return on their outstanding debts
outside of the pro rata distribution process.46 Second, through
if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an insider; and (5) that enables
such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if—(A) the
case were a case under chapter 7 of this title . . .; (B) the transfer had not been
made; and (C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title . . . .
Id. (citations omitted).
41 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012). See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547.01 (Richard Levin & Henry
J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
42 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012). See John Ames, Preferences and Fraudulent Transfers Under
the Bankruptcy Code: A Primer in Pain, THE AMERICAS RESTRUCTURING AND INSOLVENCY
GUIDE
2008/2009
(2008),
http://www.americasrestructuring.com/08_SF/p107-115%
20Preferences%20and%20fraudulent%20transfers.pdf (emphasizing that each component must be
met).
43 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(outlining the role of the Trustee in general, and the role of the Trustee in voiding preferential
transfers in particular).
44 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547.03 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(detailing how the old notion of the importance of intent has not carried over into the 1978
enactment of the Federal Bankruptcy Code and future amendments).
45 Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (2012). This note will focus on the exemptions barring
avoidance under Section 547(c)(5), in particular the security interest provisions.
46 See Countryman, supra note 36 (discussing the policy behind Congress’s adoption of the
§ 547 preference action).
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streamlining the ordering of liquidation and distribution, courts have a
chance to maximize a bankruptcy estate for the benefit of the largest
number of creditors possible, while also increasing economic
efficiency.47 Scholars have emphasized that, in line with the principles
stated above, voidable preference actions aim to preserve the integrity of
the bankruptcy estate, focusing on whether or not a pre-petition transfer
diminishes what would otherwise go to support the outstanding debts
owed other creditors who have not—fully or in part—secured their
positions.48 Some scholars even argue that the ability of the Trustee to
void transfers under a judicial lien goes to the very heart of the Code’s
organizing principle.49 A proper weight should be given to the duty of the
Trustee in pursuit of voiding fraudulent and preferential transfers alike,
despite any ambiguity in setoff rights.50
The lynchpin for purposes of analysis infra is the Section 547
voidable preference action’s construction of a hypothetical Chapter 7
liquidation and the court’s application of the “greater amount” test.51 As
detailed in Section 547(b)(5), the Code directs the bankruptcy courts to
determine how a pre-petition transfer of property from the debtor to the
creditor impacts that creditor in relation to the creditors of other classes.
Besides the factual components in a Section 547 action, such as
determining when the debt occurred, and who is paying on behalf of
whom, the Section 547(b)(5) hypothetical requires the construction of a
fictional Chapter 7 liquidation to determine if, but for the transfer in
question, the creditor in question would not receive more from the pro
rata distribution relative to creditors of other classes.52 If the other
components of Section 547 have been met, then a positive answer to the
hypothetical—that the transfer allows the creditor to receive more from a

47 Id. See J. Henk Taylor & Justin Henderson, Preferences, AM. B. ASS’N: BUS. L. TODAY
(March, 2010), https://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/blt/2010-03-04/taylor-henderson.shtml.
48 David G. Carlson, Claims & Opinions: Tripartite Voidable Preferences, 11 BANK. DEV. J.
219, 230-31(1995).
49 See David G. Carlson, Bankruptcy’s Organizing Principle, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 549
(proposing that the Code’s organizing principle—its modus vivendi—is better understood under a
“strong arm” theory, whereby the estate is created by the establishment of the ability of the Trustee
to exert a judicial lien on all the property of the debtor. This power gives rise to fraudulent transfer
law and voidable preference law and, as such, is a more aggressive image of the Code that envisions
an active Trusteeship at its heart).
50 Id.
51 Alvarado v. Walsh (In re LCO Enters.), 12 F.3d 938, 941 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that,
“[this] . . . ‘greater amount’ test, requires the court to construct a hypothetical chapter 7 case and
determine what the creditor would have received if the case had proceeded under chapter 7.”)
(citations omitted).
52 See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2012); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 547.03 (Richard Levin &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (requiring all five elements to be present for a court to affirm a
preference to be voidable, hinging on testing if the creditor would be better off relative to other
creditors of the same class).
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Chapter 7 liquidation relative to other creditors—will most likely warrant
the transfer to be voided.53 This follows the Supreme Court’s holding in
Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown. In that case, a creditor had appealed
a lower court’s decision rejecting the creditor’s claim that the Trustee had
to demonstrate a more exacting measure of how each transfer made
during insolvency by the debtor was providing the creditor a greater
percentage of recovery than during distribution.54 The court held that a
payment could be found to be a preference if, at the time of the petition,
rather than at the time the alleged preferential payment is made, the
overall effect of the transfer is to place the creditor in a better position
relative to creditors of that same class.55 Importantly, the Supreme Court
held that the appropriate standard involves making a determination of the
actual result of the transfer in question at the time of the petition.56
In juxtaposition to the adversarial actions available to the Trustee on
behalf of the bankruptcy estate, consider the extent and intent of the rights
of creditors in a Chapter 7 liquidation as detailed in Section 553.
C.

Section 553 Set-Off Rights, Limitations, and Applications

A hold-over from Roman law and a right embodied by state law and
non-bankruptcy-related federal law, Section 553 may provide creditors
with an avenue to attempt to satisfy cross-demands arising from debts
owed to a debtor.57 The underlying policy of Section 553 has been
expressed as an attempt to avoid the “absurdity of making A pay B when
B owes A.”58 If argued successfully, then an unsecured or under secured
creditor will be able to negate the effects of the automatic stay of
bankruptcy and proceed to claim a set-off right against the debtor, with
the ultimate objective being that of securing a higher amount on their
outstanding claims against the debtor in question.59 Under Section 553,
53 Considering any exemptions under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (2012) (exempting security
interests withstanding any improvement in position test).
54 Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227, 228 (1936).
55 Palmer Clay Products Co., 297 U.S. at 229 (“[a] payment which enables the creditor ‘to
obtain a greater percentage of his debt than any other of such creditors of the same class’ is a
preference.”).
56 Id.
57 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(emphasizing the historical recognition of set-off as an equitable right); Maria Ehlinger, The
Differences Between the Right to Setoff Under 11 U.S.C. § 553 and 11 U.S.C. § 558, 6 ST. JOHN’S
BANKR. RESEARCH LIBR. NO. 11 (2014); Stephen L. Sepinuck, The Problem with Setoff: A
Proposed Legislative Solution, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 51, 51-52 (1988) (illuminating the Roman
origins of the law).
58 Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 19 (1995) (“the absurdity of making A
pay B when B owes A” (quoting Studley v. Boylston National Bank, 229 U.S. 523, 528 (1913)).
59 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
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unsecured creditors are offered a route by which they may ask the court
to lift the stay and claim a previous transfer of property to be considered
a valid set-off against a debt owed to the petitioner.60 If a court is to
determine whether an outstanding claim owed by a debtor is the subject
of a valid pre-petition set-off, then it is crucial to note that that amount
would be immune to the effects of a voidable preference action.61
The Section 553 application of set-off rights is a key tool available
to creditors in their pursuit of a more advantageous position in relation to
other creditors.62 Though not actually granted within the Code,63 the
Section 553’s provisions recognize and demarcate the parameters of a
valid set-off right.64 As a matter of procedure, creditors will launch a setoff right action by petitioning the court to temporarily lift the automatic
stay of bankruptcy.65 This action is categorized as a counter claim in the
parlance of bankruptcy procedure.66 The creditor will then have to
demonstrate that their claim is a valid manifestation of the right to set-off
a mutually-owed debt.67 To do so, the creditor will have to comply with
provisions of the Code by a preponderance of the evidence and show that
the debt arose before the petition date among the same parties acting in
the same capacity.68 This “mutuality of debt” requirement mitigates the
risk of set-off rights being launched against fraudulent transfers, as well
as set-offs being utilized against debts accrued by a third party to a
transaction.69 As a tool, clever creditors can circumvent the pro rata
distribution process by using set-off rights to further secure their position.
Against other unsecured or under secured creditors, a successful setoff right action will not just benefit the creditor in relation to those in the
same category, it may actually place the creditor into an entirely separate
position.70 Under the Code, an unsecured or under secured creditor with
a valid set-off right will have their claim classified as a secured interest,
guaranteeing payment to that amount.71 Creditors with a valid and

60

11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(under the definition of “transfer” supra, a set-off cannot be considered a transfer and thus cannot
be targeted in a voidable preference action). Consider explaining more ATL.
62 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.11 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
63 Rights to set-off are delineated in relevant state law and federal statutes, not in the Code.
64 Sepinuck, supra note 57.
65 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.05 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
66 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.11 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
67 Id.
68 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
69 See Sepinuck, supra note 57.
70 See 11 U.S.C.S. § 506(a)(1) (2012).
71 Id.
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manifested72 set-off right cannot be subject to a voidable preference
action.73 Within the Code, a Section 547 voidable preference action can
only utilize the Trustee’s authority to expand and protect the integrity of
the bankruptcy estate by targeting valid pre-petition transfers.74 Since the
Code omits the word “set-off” from its definition of what constitutes a
transfer, a set-off theoretically puts that creditor’s claim out of the reach
of a Trustee.75
Section 553(b) recognizes a bypass to Section 547 avoidance for setoffs in line with those imagined by Section 547. If the creditor manifests
its pre-petition setoff claim, the Section grants the Trustee the ability to
recover part of the pre-petition setoff from the creditor.76 A pre-petition
claim is one made while the court would consider the debtor to be
insolvent, a presumed policy being that 553(b) no longer applies as a
penalty for creditors that wait until the automatic stay to attempt to
recover from a mutual debt.77 The Trustee may recover up to the amount
that the set-off improved the creditor’s position in recovering what is
owed on an outstanding debt relative to certain benchmarks in the prepetition period.78 This test therefore acts to measure the level of
“insufficiency” vis-á-vis the debtor’s financial ability to pay his debts
pre-petition.79
Relevant here, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reiterated in In re
Bernard that as for a deposit account, the transfer of funds to the bank
serves to pass title immediately and creates a creditor-debtor relationship
between the two parties such that the bank owes the owner of the deposit
account up to the amount deposited.80 The nature of bank deposits will be
helpful to illustrate the limitations of Section 553(b).
To illustrate a set-off right executed pre-petition and subject to
Section 553(b), imagine a bank has a claim against a debtor for $20,000.
Ninety days before the debtor files for bankruptcy—the period during
which the court considers the debtor insolvent—that debtor has $10,000
in deposit at the same bank. Ninety days before the petition, there is a
72

As opposed to a claim to set-off that has not been properly filed.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
74 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5) (2012).
75 See 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
76 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.08 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
77 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(“Bankruptcy code provides more advantageous treatment for creditors who wait until after
bankruptcy to exercise set-off rights.”)
78 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
79 Id. See Ben Caughey, A Creditor’s Right to Setoff: When Does a Creditor Impermissibly
Improve Its Position?, 29-JAN AM. BANKR. INST. J. 32 (Dec.-Jan., 2011); 11 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
80 Bernard v. Sheaffer (In re Bernard), 96 F.3d 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Robert Laurence,
The Application of Section 553 Set-Off Analysis to Pre-Bankruptcy Negative-Balance Checking
Account Activity, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 101, 110-11 (1995).
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difference of $10,000 between the amount claimed by the bank and the
amount the bank owes the debtor. This leads to an inability to cover the
claim and is called an insufficiency. Twenty days before the debtor files
for bankruptcy, he deposits another $5,000 into the account, thereby
reducing this insufficiency from $10,000 to $5,000. The bank may see
some signs of an imminent default on outstanding loans extended to the
debtor, and may therefore wish to capitalize on the opportunity to
improve its chances of recovering a higher amount on the outstanding
debts. The bank claims a set-off right to the whole account of $15,000,
twenty days prior to the bankruptcy petition. Because the insufficiency
twenty days prior is less than the insufficiency at the benchmark of
ninety-days prior, the bank has improved its position pre-petition from an
insufficiency of $10,000 to $5,000. Accordingly, the Trustee is
empowered under Section 553(b) to recover the $5,000 improvement,
while the bank may claim the remaining $10,000 from the account.81 This
hypothetical is meant to demonstrate, specifically, when an insufficiency
exists at the beginning of the ninety-day period prior to petition.82
As it currently stands, the Section 553(b) recovery provision
operates pursuant to the major principles of the Code discussed above.
To deter creditors from “seizing the moment” and claiming set-off at a
point pre-petition where a creditor increased the amount it owes the
debtor, Section 553(b) empowers the Trustee to recover the improvement
for the bankruptcy estate, much like a voidable preference action in
Section 547.83 According to Congress, a major concern arose from the
notion that creditors, including banks, “. . . holding mutual accounts with
the debtor would foresee a bankruptcy filing and scramble to secure a
better position by decreasing the ‘insufficiency’ to the detriment of the
other creditors.”84 Though not a perfect analogy, it is helpful to consider
this “improvement in position” measurement from Section 553(b) in
relation to a transfer of property from a debtor to a creditor that may put
the creditor in a better position for remunerative relief relative to other
creditors in the same category.85
II. RECONCILING THE HYPOTHETICAL CHAPTER 7 LIQUIDATION WITH
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See Laurence, supra note 80.
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
83 Id.
84 Lee v. Schweiker, 739 F.2d 870, 877 (3d Cir. 1984) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong.
2d Sess. at 185, 1978 U.S. Cong. & Ad. News at 6145).
85 See id.
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CREDITORS’ RIGHTS TO SET-OFF: A MISINTERPRETATION OF MEANING
Did the Ninth Circuit get it right in engaging in a hypothetical
preference action to void the deposit claimed by the Bank-Creditor in part
under its proposed right to set-off within the hypothetical Chapter 7
liquidation, and finding that the deposit was a voidable preference? The
central issue here is whether the Code empowers a bankruptcy court to
find a reasonable Trustee successful in a hypothetical preference action
within the context of a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation, qualifying a
deposit of funds as a transfer under the Code’s definition and thereby
permitting the Trustee to void the transfer and deny secured status to a
creditor.86 In answering this question in the affirmative, this Note will
highlight the Ninth Circuit’s decision in In re Tenderloin as an attempt to
propose an equitable solution in the context of current practice, and the
legislative history behind both Section 547 and Section 553, as well as
Congress’ intent in defining “transfer.”
A.

Embracing Bankruptcy’s Use of Hypotheticals and a Broad
Interpretation of “Transfer”

The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning turns on a liberal interpretation of the
flexibility of hypothetical applications and “transfer” throughout the
Code, turning to recent decisions and interpretation as to Section
547(b)(5) allowing further hypothetical preference actions.87 In support
of this evaluation, consider the following applications of hypothetical
constructs in Chapter 11 reorganizations and Chapter 13 adjustment of an
individuals’ debts with a regular income.
In a Chapter 11 reorganization, a business or organization will
petition the court in an attempt to discharge its current debts and continue
on with its operations: the outcome depends on examining a hypothetical
Chapter 7 liquidation.88 A petitioner must demonstrate a Chapter 11
reorganization plan’s compliance with congressionally-mandated
minimum requirements,89 consent being sought from each class of
creditors involved in the matter.90 A central measure involved in

86 This analysis wrestles with how, in part, a court may negate security rights by way of
voidable preference in the face of Section 553.
87 Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231, 1235-36
(9th Cir. 2017).
88 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1100.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
89 Id. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02 (Richard Levin
& Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
90 11 U.S.C. § 1129; see also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
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determining if a Chapter 11 plan will be compliant with the mandated
minimum requirements is laid out in Section 1129, which provides for
the confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan.91 Among the other pre-requisites
before confirming a plan within Section 1129, sub-section 1129(a)(7)(A)
provides that a court can only give the green light if each holder has
accepted the plan, or if no creditor will be worse off in terms of recouping
their outstanding claims than if the case had been under a Chapter 7
liquidation. In re Affiliated Foods, Inc. demonstrated a bankruptcy court
interpreting the statute’s use of the hypothetical as requiring an estimate
of probable values and successful causes of action, including preference
actions.92 Far from “an exact science,” the court does not go so far as to
allow a determination of value to be entirely composed of assumptions.93
Regardless, the application of the comparison measure to what would be
received under Chapter 7 liquidation is considered a cornerstone of the
Chapter 11 practice.94 Therein, courts are asked to determine the value to
be attained by selling off assets, requiring consultation and speculation
based on a number of external factors such as the event of a “fire-sale”
and the disposition of contingent liabilities.95 As 7,442 filers relied on
Chapter 11 reorganizations in 2017 alone, it is clear that resorting to the
hypothetical construction of a Chapter 7 liquidation is a cornerstone of
bankruptcy practice writ large.96
A similar freedom to include the occurrence of voidable preference
actions in Section 547(b)(5) hypothetical liquidations has also been
interpreted by bankruptcy courts in Chapter 13 adjustment of debts of an
individual with regular income.97 Section 1325 deals with the
requirements that a plan of adjustment must meet to be confirmed by the
court petitioned by the debtor.98 Sub-section 1325(a)(4) sets forth what is
known as the “best interest” test.99 Much like the comparison to the
results of a Chapter 7 liquidation procedure in the reorganization of an
entity under Chapter 11, Chapter 13 intends, per the leading bankruptcy
treatise, to put classes of creditors in no worse a position than they would
91

11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A) (2012).
In re Affiliated Foods, Inc., 249 B.R. 770, 788 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000).
93 Id.
94 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
95 See id. (considering the cornerstone to be the individual guaranty).
96 U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURTS REPORT F-5A ON BUSINESS AND NONBUSINESS BANKRUPTCY
COUNTY CASES COMMENCED, BY CHAPTER OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE, DURING THE 12-MONTH
PERIOD ENDING DECEMBER 31, 2017, http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/bf_
f5a_1231.2017.pdf (though a substantial number, Chapter 11 reorganizations accounted for only
.94% of all bankruptcies filed in 2017).
97 See infra note 99.
98 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4) (2012).
99 See id.; COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.05 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th
ed.) (individual consent of the claimants is unnecessary, unlike in Chapter 11).
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be if the debtor’s assets were liquidated and distributed pro rata.100 In the
Chapter 13 “best interests” context, the amount to be distributed to each
unsecured claimant may not be less than would be received if the estate
was being distributed under the Chapter 7 procedure, which calls for a
hypothetical exercise.101 While each unsecured claimant does not need to
provide consent to the plan, the “best interests of the creditors” test stands
in to ensure a more equitable distribution, especially for those
claimants.102 Importantly, the court may be asked to ascribe a liquidation
value to the assets under consideration in the adjustment of debts of an
individual with regular income while considering the success of a
concurrent voidable preference action. In re Larson, a Minnesota
bankruptcy case, provides support for the notion that the court should
have no issue allowing for the possibility of a Trustee to use his authority
to void potential preferential transfers, in line with Section 547 of the
Code, when ascribing liquidation values to the assets of a debtor with
regular income.103 There, the court dealt with an interest under fraudulent
transfer, but the inclusion of consideration for hypothetical preference
actions within a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation remains telling.104 It
is not beyond the pale to determine that in confirming a plan in the
Chapter 13 context, a court may conjure up a hypothetical preference
action within a Chapter 7 liquidation.105
B.

The Inclusion (or Exclusion) of Facts Indicating Possible 553 Setoff Rights in a Chapter 7 Liquidation Hypothetical

Consider where the court in In re Tenderloin found itself.106 The
question for the court to decide turned on whether or not to believe that a
reasonable Trustee would void the amount deposited by the debtor with
the bank-creditor in addition to the payment made on behalf of the
antecedent debt in a series of voidable preference actions. In addition, at
the time of the action, the creditor had not sought to exert a set-off right
yet. The question also involved a supplementary hypothetical for the
court to engage in: whether a further hypothetical preference action can
100

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.05 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
Id.
102 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 78 (individual consent of the claimants is
unnecessary, unlike in Chapter 11). See also 11 U.S.C.S. § 1325(a)(4) (1978).
103 In re Larson, 245 B.R. 609, 614 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (“. . . look not only at the Debtor’s
asset . . . but [also] consider the recovery of assets by the trustee through fraudulent transfer and
preference actions.”)
104 See id.
105 See Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231 (9th
Cir. 2017) (this is how the Ninth Circuit chose to interpret the “best interests” test).
106 See Introduction, supra.
101
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consider a Section 553 right that had not been exercised within a
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.107
The In re Tenderloin case saw the Ninth Circuit deal with the
Gordian-knot above, centered on the applicability of facts not reflected in
the record entering into a court’s Chapter 7 hypothetical in the face of an
alleged right to set-off.108 The petitioning debtor’s (D) Trustee had moved
for a voidable preference action, targeting the payment made by the
debtor to the bank-creditor (C).109 The payment had been made within the
previous ninety days, from D to C on behalf of the pre-existing debt
existing between the two.110 Therefore, the Trustee claimed that this
transfer was ripe for consideration as a voidable preference. The Trustee
argued that if C was allowed to keep the payment made by the D, then
the C would be put in a better position relative to other unsecured
creditors, in conflict with interpreted purposes of the Code.111 In
response, C claimed that despite the possible categorization of the debt
payment as a voidable preference, the remaining amount deposited with
the bank by D after selling off real estate and paying down its debt would
serve to act as a valid set-off, negating the existence of a voidable
preference.112 C reasoned that as a deposit with the bank, the amount
therein, at the least, would be considered a mutual debt warranting a
future set-off, to be exercised post-petition; thereby exempting the set-off
from the Section 553(B) improvement in position test.113 Even if the
payment preference was voided, there would be a fully secured amount
in the form of the deposit account available for the bank to utilize.114 D’s
Trustee thus put forth the argument that a reasonable Trustee would move
to void the deposit amount in addition to the payment made on behalf of
the pre-existing debt, and that the court could successfully find the
existence of a preferential transfer here.115 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit
considered whether to allow negating a possibly valid set-off right in the
face of facts that might adhere to a less equitable outcome for unsecured
creditors. The Ninth Circuit grounded their answer in the idea that a
107

See In re Tenderloin Health, 849 F.3d at 1234.
Id.
109 Id. at 1233.
110 Id.
111 Id.
112 See In re Tenderloin Health, 849 F.3d at 1234 (“[C]oncluding that Schoenmann could not
show that BOTW received more than it would have in a hypothetical liquidation where the debt
payment had not been made.”).
113 See id. See also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.09 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer
eds., 16th ed.) (detailing the treatment of Section 553 in avoidance considerations).
114 See Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231, 1241
(9th Cir. 2017) (“Schoenmann concedes that BOTW would have a right of setoff in the hypothetical
liquidation.”).
115 See id. at 1236.
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reasonable Trustee would be successful in voiding not only the debt
payment, but also the deposit made to the bank in a hypothetical Chapter
7 liquidation.116
The Ninth Circuit therefore agreed with the Trustee. In In re
Tenderloin, the court ultimately held that, facts permitting and as long as
no other independent provision of the Code was infringed upon, a court
could entertain this kind of hypothetical preference action in the face of
a potential set-off right within a larger Chapter 7 hypothetical.117 This
result further established that in this secondary hypothetical, the
preference action within the larger hypothetical, the amount deposited
after the payment was a transfer that depleted the estate to the prejudice
of unsecured creditors, and was a valid use of the strong-arm of voidable
preference law.118 In finding so, the court looked to legislative history and
current bankruptcy practices at large to derive a practical application
beyond the plain meaning of the text.119
To support its interpretation, the court points to language found in
the House Report regarding Section 547(b) preference actions in support
of Section 547’s hypothetical flexibility.120 Specifically, the Report does
not impose a limit to the tools by which the court achieves a proper
“distribution” under the Code’s voidable preference action provisions.121
With language referring to the purpose of the provision as an attempt to
achieve equality for creditors of the same class, the Report demonstrates
a broad approach to achieving this effort.122 In addition, the court points
to the language of the report in its acceptance of a court applying the
“greater amounts” test in conjunction with an evaluation of the
permissiveness of the claim as a whole, invoking the court’s ability to
take a global perspective on the preference action.123 The Ninth Circuit
took this analysis as a green-light for evaluating the nature of both the
debt payment and the deposit in the name of promoting the equality of all
unsecured creditors and the enlargement of the bankruptcy estate.124
116

Id.
Id. at 1245.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595 (1977).
121 Id., at 86.
122 In re Tenderloin Health, 849 F.3d at 1236 (“‘A preference is a transfer that enables a creditor
to receive payment of a greater percentage of his claim against the debtor than he would have
received if the transfer had not been made and he had participated in the distribution of the assets . . .
.’ H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 177 (1977) . . . The phrase ‘participate[s] in the distribution’ leaves
room to assume the hypothetical chapter 7 Trustee might initiate preference actions in conjunction
with the ‘distribution’ of the assets of the estate.”).
123 See H.R. Rep. No.95-595, at 372 (1978) (invoking “allowability” in the evaluation a
preference action).
124 See supra note 122.
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Beyond the legislative history, the court surveyed how courts and
scholars, including the Ninth Circuit, have considered hypotheticals
arising out of other provisions of the Code akin to those directly under
the Chapter 7 liquidation process, surveying the possibility to subsume
Section 553 by voidable preference action.125 The instructive jumping off
point to begin an examination of the application of the hypothetical in the
context of voidable preference actions comes from the Supreme Court in
its ruling in Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown.126 There, the Supreme
Court held that the preference action determines the result of the “greater
amounts” test in relation to the position of the creditor on the day of the
bankruptcy petition, as opposed to the time of the transaction in
question.127 This deference to an “actual effect” on the bankruptcy estate
analysis demonstrates the importance of determining the ability of the
bankruptcy estate to quickly and equitably pay out to creditors the
outstanding amount of debt owed by the petitioner.128 Though focused on
the timing of the preferential transfer in determining its existence, the
decision makes an attempt at understanding both timing and intent in
relation to voidable preference actions.129 Importantly, the Court takes
into account Congress’ intention in determining the purpose of the
hypothetical construction for a preference action.130
The Minnesota bankruptcy court offered guidance on the
consideration of additional post-petition facts, like the viability of a
Section 553 right, in preference actions in the context of a Chapter 13
plan.131 Regarding the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan, the Code calls
for a test to determine if in fact the plan is in the “best interest of the
creditors.”132 Derived from Section 1325, the court takes it upon itself to
determine if the creditors would receive more under the suggested plan
than if they received a distribution under a Chapter 7 liquidation.133 This
consideration, in the reasoning of the Minnesota bankruptcy court,
requires a consideration of a recovery of assets by the Trustee pursuant
to both fraudulent transfers per Section 548 and voidable preferences per
125 See Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231, 124546 (9th Cir. 2017).
126 See Palmer Clay Products Co. v. Brown, 297 U.S. 227 (1936).
127 Id. at 229 (determining if a creditor has received a preference by examining the “actual effect
of the payment as determined when bankruptcy results.”).
128 See id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 See In re Larson, 245 B.R. 609 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000).
132 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3), (4) (2012) (outlining how to determine what would be a plan
that would act in the “best interest of the creditors”). See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1325.05
(Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (individual consent of the claimants is
unnecessary, unlike in Chapter 11).
133 Id.
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Section 547.134 Considering the facts, the bankruptcy court reversed a
potential Chapter 13 plan confirmation by finding a breach of good faith
and held that a reasonable Trustee—a hypothetical Trustee within the
hypothetical “best interest of the creditors” test—would most likely
prevail on a petition for fraudulent transfer.135 Though the court did not
need to determine if the hypothetical assets could be recovered by way of
the hypothetical preference action on the facts of the case, the court
determined that if they could find a reasonable Trustee would succeed in
its petition for the action, then the court could continue with its analysis
of the Chapter 7 liquidation distribution with the value of those assets in
question added to the bankruptcy estate.136 Here, a determination of bad
faith and the notion that a reasonable Trustee would prevail in a
hypothetical post-petition fraudulent transfer action goes to support the
application of hypothetical actions within the hypothetical Chapter 7
liquidation as debated in In re Tenderloin.137
Chapter 11 of the Code also provides instruction on the application
of Chapter 7 liquidation hypotheticals in its own context.138 For the
purposes of Section 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii), a court conducts the same “best
interest of the creditors” test as conducted in Chapter 13 of the Code.139
For a court to confirm a plan of reorganization, each holder of a claim at
issue must receive property of value as of the date of the plan that is not
in less than what the claimant would receive if the plan was conducted
under a Chapter 7 liquidation.140 In clarifying its application, the Ninth
Circuit accepted that the Trustee’s avoiding powers may affect the
analysis of the Chapter 7 hypothetical liquidation.141 For the purposes of
the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the hypothetical regarding the bankcreditor and the deposit in question, these aforementioned provisions of
the Code would support an application of the Trustees avoiding powers

134 See In re Larson, 245 B.R. 609, 615, at n.2 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000) (the bankruptcy court
here does not consider any issues of fraudulent transfer as the transfer at issue occurred more than
a year prior to the petition being filed) (discussing 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2012)).
135 Id. at 615.
136 See id. (“I need only reach the conclusion that a Chapter 7 Trustee could be reasonably
expected to succeed in setting aside the transfer.”).
137 In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d at 1238.
138 See discussion supra Part II Sub-Section A (discussing the interpretation of In re Affiliate
Foods).
139 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(7)(A)(ii) (2012) (outlining the process by which a court determines
whether or not a plan is in the “best interests of the creditors”). See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
¶ 1129.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(7)(A)(ii).
141 See Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231(9th
Cir. 2017) (citing § 1129 in the argument that a Trustee’s avoiding powers may affect the analysis
of the hypothetical). See also COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1129.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 16th ed.).
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to achieve a status of equilibrium among creditors within the same
class.142
The Ninth Circuit’s own interpretation of the role of post-petition
facts within a hypothetical in the context of the Code offers important
guidance here as well. The Circuit’s decision in Alvarado v. Walsh (In re
LCO Enters.) (hereinafter LCO Enters.) provides a clearer interpretation
of the parameters of the court’s logic regarding applying post-petition
facts to a Chapter 7 hypothetical.143 There, the facts regard a lessee-debtor
rearranging a pre-existing lease with a lessor-creditor before sliding into
bankruptcy and petitioning the court for reprieve under Chapter 11.144 At
the Trustee’s petitioning, the court considered the validity of a voidable
preference action on certain pre-petition payments made in service of the
lease in question.145 Again, the court was faced with the task of following
the “greater amounts” test to determine if in fact the pre-petition lease
payments prefer a lessor in an inequitable fashion as compared to other
unsecured creditors. However, the nature of this question turns on the
Code’s treatment of leases assumed or rejected by the creditor
involved.146 Here, the Trustee attempted to persuade the court that the
rent payments were in fact preferential transfers.147 The Trustee argued
that a reasonable Trustee faced with the same facts would have sought to
reject the lease at hand.148 If that had been the case, the lessor-creditor
would have the right to recapture the property immediately and enter into
the bankruptcy proceeding with a fully secured claim to the revenue from
rent.149 On the other hand, if the lease had been assumed, then the debtorlessee may continue to utilize the property pursuant to the lease, and the
lessor-creditor would have the right to receive an immediate correction
to default by the lessee-debtor.150 The lease had in fact been assumed by
the parties, and the lessee-debtor retained use of the premises.151 As such,
the treatment of the payments in question were addressed by the Code’s
Section 365(b).152 Section 365 acts as a caveat to preferential transfers

142

See In re Tenderloin Health, 849 F.3d at 1245.
See Alvarado v. Walsh (In re LCO Enters.), 12 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1993).
144 See id.
145 Id.
146 Id. at 941.
147 See id. at 941.
148 See id. at 942 (“Thus, the Trustee seeks to obtain the benefits of both assumption and
rejection, i.e., continued possession of the property and recovery of the prepetition rent.”).
149 See Alvarado v. Walsh (In re LCO Enters.), 12 F.3d 938, 941-42 (9th Cir. 1993) (properly
conforming to 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) determining secured status requirements bestows preferred status
on a claim.).
150 Id.
151 See id. at 942.
152 See id.
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and treats unexpired leases separately from other antecedent debts.153
Thus, the court would not be likely to consider the payment in question
here a preferential transfer.154 In the court’s opinion, the lessee-debtor had
sought to enlarge the bankruptcy estate by unwinding the pre-petition rent
payments while also maintaining his domicile, a maneuver the court felt
both to be in violation of the provisions of the Code and its underlying
principles of equity.155
The Ninth Circuit’s earlier disposition of post-petition facts entering
into a hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation does not pose an obstacle to
apply in a judge-made rule.156 As the bank-creditor would go on to argue
in In re Tenderloin, the Ninth Circuit in LCO Enters. rejected the notion
that a post-petition hypothetical may enter, nested as Russian dolls, into
another hypothetical, but—and as the court in Tenderloin would
eventually assert—this is not necessarily the case.157 Essentially, the
court established that the Section 547(b)(5) “greater amounts”
hypothetical must be based on the actual facts of the case.158 While noting
that the court cannot engage in the “greater amounts” test hypothetical by
simply creating a system of facts “from whole cloth,” the court
recognized that the hypothetical is not “conducted in a vacuum.”159
Importantly here, the pre-petition adoption of a lease triggers the
application of Section 365(b), and the “greater amounts” test put the
Ninth Circuit in the position of having to consider facts that were not
reflective of the actual situation at the time of petitioning.160 Unlike a setoff right left unexercised by a creditor, the lease’s assumption was made
clear in the Chapter 11 Reorganization plan.161 This would have required
the court to destroy the clear applicability of § 365(b).162 Considering the
particularity of its judgment in LCO Enters., the court viewed the
decision narrowly, focusing in greater detail on the necessity not to
violate an independent provision of the Code in pursuit of a voidable

153 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.02 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(further expanding on the nature of leases unexpired leases).
154 See Alvarado, 12 F.3d at 942 (“LCO’s default was cured as required by § 365(b) and LCO
retained possession of the property.”); COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.01 (Richard Levin &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.) (outlining the treatment of executive contracts and unexpired
leases under the Code).
155 See supra note 148.
156 See In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 2017). See infra Proposal.
157 In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d at 1238-40 (the court appears not to be willing to consider a
limitation on its ability to justify the outcome of the hypothetical preference action in light of the
crucial difference in the fact patterns of LCO Enters. and In re Tenderloin).
158 Id.
159 See In re LCO Enters., 12 F.3d at 942; In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d at 1238.
160 In re LCO Enters., 12 F.3d at 942.
161 Id.
162 In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d at 1239.
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preference action.163 This is not to say, in the eyes of the court, that, if the
applicability of another provision of the Code has not been clearly
triggered, the court cannot be liberal when considering the actions of a
reasonable Trustee in the course of a “greater amounts” test
hypothetical.164 Thus, neither the Trustee nor the court are permitted to
run amok and add facts to suit their needs for a beneficial result in a
voidable preference action.165 Parameters deter either from encroaching
on the established territory of independent provisions when the facts
clearly support its application.166
Finally, the Fifth Circuit offers persuasive guidance in
contemplating an unexercised right post-petition entering into a Section
553 set-off right analysis.167 Braniff Airways v. Exxon Co. presents
similar facts to Tenderloin. Debtor’s Trustee had petitioned the court to
seek an unwinding of a pre-petition payment as a preferential transfer.168
In response, the creditor asserted the right to set-off a pre-existing debt
owed to the debtor.169 Ultimately, the court would go on to overrule the
lower court, deciding that the creditor’s right to set-off was invalid in
light of the absence of an “insufficiency” traditionally granting a right to
set-off, in addition to the fact that the record did not allow the court to
rule on whether a sufficient mutual debt existed at the time of the petition
to warrant the creditor’s application of a set-off right.170 Crucially, it did
not matter that the creditor’s right to set-off was not negatively affected
by the creditor’s failure to implement a set-off right at that time. The right
to a set-off would still enter into the analysis.171 The Ninth Circuit
highlighted this application in its explanation, holding that a hypothetical
application of post-petition facts would not stop short at an application of
some provisions of the Code and not others. The court rejected the idea
that a Section 553 set-off right would be entered into an analysis

163 See In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d at 1240 (“In light of this conflict, we conclude that LCO must
be narrowly construed. To that end, courts that have followed LCO’s holding have done so when
presented with the same statutory collision scenario.”).
164 Id. (“In sum, LCO does not bar us in this case from assuming in a hypothetical liquidation
that the hypothetical Trustee would sue to recover the . . . deposit.”).
165 Id.
166 The Ninth Circuit adopts this as a tenet of their reasoning. See Part III, infra.
167 In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 2017).
168 Braniff Airways v. Exxon Co., 814 F.2d 1030, 1034 (5th Cir. 1987).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 1041.
171 See id. at 1032 (“We find that Exxon does have a right of setoff pursuant to 11 U.S.C.
§ 553(a), but that any setoff is potentially subject to being recovered by Braniff pursuant to 11
U.S.C. § 553(b).”).
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regardless of its actual occurrence when a hypothetical preference action
would not.172
C.

Weighing the Equities of Set-Off Rights Against the Law of
Voidable Preferences

Considered an equitable right, Section 553 presents an interesting
dilemma when put in the context of creditor’s rights in the event of
bankruptcy, as it comes into conversation with voidable preference
law.173 Scholars argue that the common law set-off right, as recognized
in the Code, does not necessarily reflect a correct positioning relative to
the rights of creditor to be treated equitably and equal to others of their
class during bankruptcy.174 All this calls into question how the lower
courts in In re Tenderloin could allow for Bank of the West to move into
bankruptcy with the improved position granted to it by a claim to set-off
the deposit made by the debtor when, had the transfer been an additional
payment and not an arbitrary deposit, voidable preference law would
have been triggered.175
Looking to the legislative history on the role of set-off rights, it is
possible to see a misguided attempt to encourage a situation in which
creditors are rewarded for holding onto a mutual obligation in an attempt
to reap that benefit during the bankruptcy distribution.176 However, the
result is a distinction in classification, putting a creditor with a plausible
right to set-off into a secured class, even if the rationale behind the setoff does not map neatly onto the facts of the case.177 In the hypothetical
172 See In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d at 1238 (9th Cir. 2017) (“That said, it would be odd to permit
bankruptcy courts conducting hypothetical liquidations to look only to section 553, while ignoring
chapter 5 provisions, like section 547.”).
173 See Beverly J. Hall, Recent Developments in Bankruptcy Law: Preferences and Setoffs:
Sections 547 and 553, 2 BANKR. DEV. J. 49, 75 (1985) (expanding on the conflict that grows out of
the Code’s limitations on set-off rights granted outside of the Code, and the powers of the Trustee
to unwind preferential transfers).
174 See Lawrence Kalevitch, Setoff and Bankruptcy, 41 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 599, 628 (“The heavy
scales of tradition make rather than measure such assumptions. It is more than likely that the present
bankruptcy law receives assumptions about setoff’s bankruptcy status from a past less affected by
reason than politics.”).
175 See supra Part I.
176 See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 184 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 5963, 6144. See also John C. McCoid, II Setoff: Why Bankruptcy Priority?
75 VA. L. REV. 15 (1989) (“the power encourages banks to keep troubled debtors afloat when the
debtor is ‘sinking into financial difficulty.’”).
177 Though a wider discussion is beyond the scope of this note, it would be relevant to discuss
the intentionality behind security agreements and how set-off rights may or may not fall outside of
the spectrum of an intentional agreement to provide a loan in exchange for collateral of value. See
David G. Carlson, Security Interests in the Crucible of Voidable Preference Law, 1995 U. ILL. L.
REV. 211, 274 (1995) (for a discussion of interests created in deposit accounts).
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described above (derived from the facts of In re Tenderloin), we see this
play out. Had the debtor held onto the amount leftover after liquidating
the real estate, or deposited the amount with another bank besides the
bank-creditor, the bankruptcy estate would be enriched.178 For creditors,
this could result in a relative windfall as the pool of property to which the
unsecured would have claim to would grow.179 However, due to the
arbitrary nature of the deposit made by the debtor, the bank has fallen
backwards into a right to set-off outside of the normal expectation of
parties that would ordinarily have mutual obligations.180 Importantly,
scholars note that the doctrine of set-off rights in bankruptcy is
legislatively imposed and dated.181 Our modern interpretation of set-off
rights is a holdover from English debtor-creditor law.182 Given the code’s
predisposition towards equality throughout the collective process of
bankruptcy, set-off rights seem a plausible counterweight.183
Despite these misgivings, any examination of the weight of set-off
rights in light of the equities presented in the above hypothetical or any
interaction between set-off rights and hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidations
must contend with the Supreme Court’s favorable reading of the right to
set-off.184 In Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, the Supreme Court came down in
favor of a broad interpretation that a bank may deny a debtor’s right to
the property transferred to an account with the bank without violating the
Code’s automatic stay.185 While Section 553 would not permit a creditor
to make a move to off-set a mutual obligation arising between the debtor
and the creditor once the petition has been granted and the automatic stay
enacted, the Court held instead that the bank was acting within its
178 Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231, 1244 (9th
Cir. 2017) (the Ninth Circuit discusses that had the deposit instead stayed in escrow, it would have
been consolidated into the estate).
179 Id. (the court discusses the end result instead being a beneficial interest going to one creditor
alone).
180 See McCoid, supra note 176 (“it is far from clear, however, that carrying financially troubled
debtors is a good thing. The consequence of doing so is perhaps more likely to further deplete the
estate available to creditors on ultimate failure than to result in saving a struggling enterprise.”)
181 See id. (“What cannot be ignored, however is that setoff in bankruptcy is a legislatively
imposed doctrine. First Parliament, then Congress, adopted a concept at odds with the equality
principle that otherwise dominates the collective process we call bankruptcy.”). By legislatively
imposed, I believe the author intends to draw a distinction between legislation that is passed down
on behalf of representing a common-sense approach to an issue and legislation that does not
represent either best practices or modern needs.
182 Id.
183 See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 553.01 (Richard Levin & Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
(outlining a set-off right as permissive, not mandatory; offers degree of discretion to bankruptcy
courts) (citing Photo Mechanical Servs. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co. (In re Photo Mechanical
Sevrs.), 179 B.R. 604 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1995)).
184 See Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, 516 U.S. 16, 21 (1995).
185 See id. (the broad reading the Supreme Court takes in Citizens is representative of a possible
unwillingness to end-run Congress and find invalid a statutory provision that collides with another).
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authority to place an “administrative hold” on the funds and that this
action did not rise to the level of an actual set-off action.186 The Supreme
Court adheres to, and supports, the right to set-off as it stands within the
Code.187 While not dispositive that set-off rights rise above the purpose
or importance of voidable preference law in any interaction between setoff rights and voidable preference actions as evinced in the hypothetical
from earlier,188 it is also not the case that the Courts have established a
clear victor among the two.189
III. PROPOSAL AND APPLICATION: THE ADOPTION OF A NEW JUDGEMADE RULE
A.

Proposal

To resolve ambiguity within the application of Section 553 set-off
rights in the context of a Section 547(b)(5) “greater amounts”
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation test, it may behoove bankruptcy courts
to adopt the logic of the Ninth Circuit in In re Tenderloin as a judge-made
rule for dealing with set-off rights that arise in instances of a larger
Chapter 7 voidable preference “greater amounts” hypothetical.
Specifically, the rule would allow a bankruptcy court to envision the
result of a voidable preference action launched within a 547(b)(5)
hypothetical liquidation when conducting the greater amounts test.
Though a seeming refutation of plain-meaning tests within the Code, this
rule would seek to harmonize set-off right limitations with the arm of the
voidable preference provision and would alleviate the seeming inequities
that may arise in a situation akin to that in front of the Ninth Circuit in In
re Tenderloin.190 An adoption to this effect would cast a large shadow
across the legal landscape of the law of set-off rights in the Bankruptcy
Code.191 However, in terms of plain meaning, this reasoning arises from
186 Id. at 19 (“Petitioner refused to pay its debt, not permanently and absolutely, but only while
it sought relief under § 362(d) from the automatic stay,” and finding this analysis to be sufficient
to show that no set-off had occurred). See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 362.01 (Richard Levin &
Henry J. Sommer eds., 16th ed.)
187 See COLLIER, supra note 183.
188 See supra Part I, Sub-Section C C.
Section 553 Set-Off Rights, Limitations (discussing
the set-off right hypothetical).
189 Since Citizens Bank v. Strumpf, In re Tenderloin has been one of the few circuit court
discussions with a holding on the issue here.
190 See In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d 1231, 1238 (9th Cir. 2017) (discussing, in part, the inequities
at play in a case in which by a seeming shift of semantics, a bank would walk away from an
otherwise under secured loan with full remuneration in hand).
191 See Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Interpreting the Bankruptcy Code: An Empirical Study of the
Supreme Court’s Bankruptcy Decisions, 3 CHAP. L. REV. 173, 184 (2000) (discussing conflicting
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an attempt to preserve the purpose and duties of the Trustee in expanding
the bankruptcy estate without doing away with the entirety of set-off
rights as preserved in the Code at large.192
As such, the adoption would empower a bankruptcy court to
entertain, for instance, a hypothetical voidable preference action within a
hypothetical Chapter 7 liquidation.193 As per the Court’s reasoning, as
long as the facts permit and no independent provision of the Code is at
risk of collision by the results of the series of hypothetical considerations,
a Court may consider what a reasonable Trustee would seek to achieve in
a voidable preference action post-petition within the hypothetical Chapter
7 liquidation test of Section 547(b)(5).194
This type of adoption is supported by various bankruptcy court
interpretations under different chapters of the Code, bankruptcy
scholarship, as well as by the Ninth Circuit in the Chapter 7 context.195 In
its application, the provision would allow courts to better effectuate the
purposes behind a strong-arm organizing principle of voidable
transfers.196 Courts may also be able to better effectuate the principle of
expanding the bankruptcy estate and casting creditors of the same class
as equal.197
Understandably, the situations in which the rule would be applied
may be limited by the parameters set out by the Ninth Circuit.198 A
contested hypothetical preference action within a larger Chapter 7
liquidation hypothetical would be limited by relevant facts. The court
would likely be wary of colliding with an independent provision of the
Bankruptcy Code or straying into creating a hypothetical from “whole

interpretive techniques among the Justices and the dilemma this gives rise to); Daniel J. Bussel,
Textualism’s Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 887, 88890 (2000) (“it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed jurisprudence not to make a
fortress out of the dictionary.”)
192 See McCoid, supra note 176.
193 In re Tenderloin, 849 F.3d at 1245.
194 Id.
195 See In re Larson, 245 B.R. 609 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2000); Alvarado v. Walsh (In re LCO
Enters.), 12 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 1993); Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health,
FKA), 849 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 2017).
196 Carlson, supra note 49. This approach would adhere more closely to the perception of the
bankruptcy estate being the creature of a judicial lien. As such, the Trustee’s powers for avoiding
preferences and fraudulent transfers are sine qua non to the disposition of a bankruptcy court ruling
on a conflict arising between set-off rights and voidable preference law.
197 See id.; In re Tenderloin, supra note 191.
198 Schoenmann v. Bank of the West (In re Tenderloin Health, FKA), 849 F.3d 1231, 1245 (9th
Cir. 2017) (“We hold that courts may entertain hypothetical preference actions within Section
547(b)(5)’s hypothetical liquidation when such an inquiry is factually warranted, supported by
appropriate evidence, and so long as the hypothetical preference action would not result in a direct
conflict with another section of the Bankruptcy Code.”)
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cloth.”199 However, this application may still go the distance in resolving
the ambiguity and tension arising around a fact pattern that pits the
Code’s protection of a creditor’s right to off-set a mutual obligation
against the ostensible purpose of the bankruptcy estate’s Trustee in its
pursuit to expand the estate and equitably distribute the assets therein
among creditors of the same class.
An important counter-argument arises around the Sixth Circuit’s
interpretation of the ineligibility of bank deposits for voidable preference.
In Meoli v. Huntington National Bank, the Sixth Circuit cited its holding
from In re Hurtado, finding that a bank lacks “dominion and control”
over deposits sufficiently to establish the deposit as a “transfer” per
Section 547.200 Indeed, if the Ninth Circuit were to hold the Sixth’s
Circuit’s interpretation of transfer as such, the voidable preference
argument would be moot. The Fourth Circuit has also adopted this
interpretation. In their decision in In re Whitley, the court found that “. . .
when a debtor deposits . . . funds into his own unrestricted checking
account in the regular course of business, he has not transferred those
funds to the bank that operates the account.”201 These holdings, however,
appear to reject the direct Congressional report defining interest as “[a]
transfer is a disposition of an interest in property. The definition of
transfer is as broad as possible. Many of the potentially limiting words in
current law are deleted, and the language is simplified.”202 As the
Supreme Court has not further elaborated on what Congress meant by
intending the definition of transfer to be as broad as possible, the Ninth
Circuit’s interpretation presents no bar to adopting this judge-made rule.
B.

Application

The most prudent resolution to the legal questions in this Note may
be the above-mentioned adoption of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
allowing for hypothetical preference actions within Section 547(b)(5)
Chapter 7 liquidation hypotheticals granted a finding of appropriate
facts.203 Barring any run-in with an independent provision of the Code,
judges in bankruptcy court proceedings may find the latitude to decide as
the Ninth Circuit did.204 Importantly, the judge-made rule discussed
199 See id. (setting out the scenario in which the court would ostensibly reserve the right to
consider a hypothetical preference action within the context of a larger Chapter 7 liquidation
hypothetical test).
200 Meoli v. Huntington National Bank, 848 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing In re Hurtado,
342 F.3d 528-33 (6th Cir. 2003)).
201 Ivey v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. (In re Whitley), 848 F.3d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 2017).
202 S. Rep. No. 95-989, at 27 (1978).
203 See supra note 198.
204 Id.
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earlier would support the court’s ability to determine the most equitable
path forward for the distribution of assets to creditors.205
In the case of In re Whitley, the interests of the unsecured creditors
would have been arguably more equitably dealt with if the fraudulent
transfers had been reverted to the bankruptcy estate.206 Though the Fourth
Circuit there dealt with Section 548, the application of the term “transfer”
is central to a voidable preference action as well, and calls into question
the factual relevancy of bank deposits which underpinned the facts of In
re Tenderloin. If the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of congressional intent
and practice were applied, it would be reasonable for the Fourth Circuit
to have reverted the bank deposit to the estate, thereby practicing a degree
of Code-specific equity for unsecured creditors.207 If the Code envisions
an equitable and speedy distribution of the assets of the bankruptcy estate,
then it is in the best interest of the parties involved to adopt this rule
encouraging a flexible approach to an already widely-applied
hypothetical test and the terms central to the facts relevant to the Ninth
Circuit’s holding.208
The holding in Meoli can also be distinguished as to demonstrate the
application of the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning.209 There, the Sixth Circuit
was tasked with reviewing a request to allow a reversion of fraudulently
transferred funds back to a bankruptcy estate.210 The equities at play do
not seem to favor an outcome in which the court, by interpreting
“transfer” broadly, would be serving the efficiency and equality concerns
of the Code.211 Therefore, the decision can be read as one in which
equities cut against finding the factual underpinnings of the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning based on equities here.212
In discussing the already wide-spread practices mentioned above
among both circuit courts and bankruptcy courts, and under multiple
provisions and chapters of the Bankruptcy Code—despite an arguably
205 See Bussel, supra note 191, at 891 (“In expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a
single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its
object and policy.”)
206 See Countryman, supra note 36, at 747 (recall the policies behind voidable preference law);
Rhodes, supra note 25 (discussion of the fiduciary duties of the Trustee to expand the bankruptcy
estate to the best interest of the creditors).
207 See supra note 206.
208 See supra note 207. See discussion supra Part II and accompanying footnotes (though an
approach that seems to highlight the “everyone is doing it” school of thought may not be persuasive
to all courts, it offers best practices of the legal system).
209 Meoli v. Huntington National Bank, 848 F.3d 716, 725 (6th Cir. 2017).
210 See id.
211 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2012) (fraudulent transfer evaluates the avoidance of ill-gotten gains and
ponders when a bank may have been complicit in accepting fraudulently conveyed property; though
beyond the scope of this Note, it is relevant to mention that 548 envisions nefarious circumstances
less challenging to the equities narrative conveyed in the hypothetical in the Introduction).
212 See id.
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ambiguous presentation by the Federal Legislature--courts have taken it
upon themselves to make the Code a living, breathing, and—most
importantly—a workable document.213
CONCLUSION
The Code stands as an achievement in codifying hundreds of years
of debtor-creditor law.214 From English Parliament to United States
Congress, the traditions regarding and ruling over the discharge of
personal liability, the creation of a bankruptcy estate, and the distribution
of assets to claimant creditors seeks to achieve a flexible and equitable
answer to the problem of insolvency and default.215 At its heart, the
provisions of Section 547 and Section 553 take their place in a line of
attempts to create a workable document that settles disputes arising
around the transfer of property during the period of insolvency, as well
as the issue of dealing with any conflicts arising out of mutual
obligations.216 Therefore, it should be no surprise that scholars and courts
alike attempt to bring greater clarity to the legislature’s efforts to bring
order to conflicts around insolvency.217 If anything, these problems
around novel hypotheticals and fact patterns serve as a testing ground for
any further clarification of the Code in the interest of both debtors and
creditors. Though possibly controversial, adopting the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning presents an opportunity to step back and reflect on how to apply
some of the fundamental fairness baked into the Code to effectuate the
equality of all bankruptcy participants.

213 It is worthwhile to note that this note does not inherently view voidable preference law as
superior or of more importance than set-off rights, but merely views that the application of best
practices in dealing with the inclusion of post-petition facts would air on the side of expanding the
rights of the Trustee to pursue a voidable preference within a 547(b)(5) greater amounts test, in line
with the understood duties of the position.
214 See Kalevitch, supra note 174.
215 See Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (1987) (for an overview
of bankruptcy policy and its role in society to effectuate collective action and recoupment under an
efficient economic model).
216 Id. See Carlson, supra note 49.
217 See Bussel, supra note 191.

